

Abstraction-Carrying Code: a Model for Mobile Code Safety

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Abstract *Proof-Carrying Code* (PCC) is a general approach to mobile code safety in which programs are augmented with a certificate (or proof). The intended benefit is that the program consumer can locally validate the certificate w.r.t. the “untrusted” program by means of a certificate checker—a process which should be much simpler, efficient, and automatic than generating the original proof. The practical uptake of PCC greatly depends on the existence of a variety of enabling technologies which allow both proving programs correct and replacing a costly verification process by an efficient checking procedure on the consumer side. In this work we propose *Abstraction-Carrying Code* (ACC), a novel approach which uses abstract interpretation as enabling technology. We argue that the large body of applications of abstract interpretation to program verification is amenable to the overall PCC scheme. In particular, we rely on an expressive class of safety policies which can be defined over different abstract domains. We use an *abstraction* (or abstract model)

of the program computed by standard static analyzers as a certificate. The validity of the abstraction on the consumer side is checked in a single pass by a very efficient and specialized abstract-interpreter. We believe that ACC brings the expressiveness, flexibility and automation which is inherent in abstract interpretation techniques to the area of mobile code safety.

Keywords Logic Programming, Static Analysis, Abstract Interpretation, Program Verification, Mobile Code Safety

§1 Introduction

One of the most important challenges which computing research faces today is the development of security techniques for verifying that the execution of a program (possibly) supplied by an untrusted source is *safe*, i.e., that it meets certain properties according to a predefined *safety policy*. Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) ³⁴⁾ is a general framework for mobile code safety which proposes to associate safety information in the form of a *certificate* to programs. The certificate (or proof) is created at compile time, and packaged along with the code. The consumer who receives or downloads the code+certificate package can then run a *checker* which by an efficient inspection of the code and the certificate, can verify the validity of the certificate and thus compliance with the safety policy. The key benefit of this “certificate-based” approach to mobile code safety is that the consumer’s task is reduced from the level of proving to the level of checking, a task that should be much simpler, efficient, and automatic than generating the original certificate.

The practical uptake of PCC greatly depends on the existence of a variety of enabling technologies which allow:

1. defining *expressive safety policies* covering a wide range of properties,
2. solving the problem of how to *automatically generate the certificates* (i.e., automatically proving the programs correct), and
3. replacing a costly verification process by an efficient checking procedure on the consumer side.

The main approaches applied up to now are based on either theorem proving or type analysis. For instance, in PCC the certificate is originally ³⁴⁾ a proof in first-order logic of certain *verification conditions* and the checking process involves ensuring that the certificate is indeed a valid first-order proof. λ Prolog

is used ³⁾ to define a representation of lemmas and definitions which helps keep the proofs small. Another proposal ⁶⁾ uses temporal logic to specify security policies in PCC. In Typed Assembly Languages, ³⁰⁾ the certificate is a type annotation of the assembly language program and the checking process involves a form of type checking. Each of the different approaches possesses their own set of stronger and weaker points. Depending on the particular safety property and the available computing resources in the consumer, some approaches are more suitable than others. In some cases the priority is to reduce the size of the certificate as much as possible in order to fit in small devices or to cope with scarce network access (as in, e.g., Oracle-based PCC ³⁶⁾ or Tactic-based PCC ⁴⁾), whereas in other cases the priority is to reduce the checking time (as in, e.g., standard PCC ³⁴⁾ or lightweight bytecode verification ²⁶⁾). As a result of all this, a successful certificate infrastructure should have a wide set of enabling technologies available for the different requirements.

In this work we propose *Abstraction-Carrying Code* (ACC), a novel approach which uses *abstract interpretation* ¹⁶⁾ as enabling technology to handle the difficult practical challenges mentioned above. Abstract interpretation is now a well-established technique which has allowed the development of very sophisticated global static program analyses that are at the same time automatic, provably correct, and practical. The basic idea of abstract interpretation is to infer information on programs by interpreting (“running”) them using abstract values rather than concrete ones, thus obtaining safe approximations of the behavior of the program. The technique allows inferring a wide range of properties about programs. Our proposal, ACC, opens the door to the applicability of this inference power as enabling technology for PCC. Figure 1 presents an overview of ACC. The certification process carried out by the code producer is depicted to the left of the figure while the checking process performed by the code consumer appears to the right. In particular, ACC has the following fundamental elements which can handle the three aforementioned challenges:

1. The first element, common to both producer and consumers, is the **Safety Policy**. We rely on an expressive class of safety policies based on “abstract”—i.e. symbolic—properties over different abstract domains. Our framework is parametric w.r.t. the abstract domain(s) of interest, which gives us generality and expressiveness, since it allows a single concrete implementation of the approach to be used without change for generating certificates for different classes of properties by simply




Fig. 1 Abstraction-Carrying Code

- adding domains as “plugins.”
2. The next element at the producer’s side is a fixed point-based static **Analyzer** which automatically infers an abstract model (or simply *abstraction*) of the mobile code which can then be used to prove that this code is safe w.r.t. the given policy in a straightforward way. In particular, we identify a *subset* of the analysis results which is sufficient for this purpose.
 3. The verification condition generator, **VCGen** in the figure, generates, from the initial safety policy and the abstraction, a *Verification Condition* (VC), which can be proved only if the execution of the code does not violate the safety policy. As in standard PCC methods, this process is performed also by the consumers in order to have a trustworthy VC.
 4. Finally, a simple, easy-to-trust (analysis) checker at the consumer’s side verifies the validity of the information on the mobile code. It is indeed a specialized abstract interpreter whose key characteristic is that it does not need to iterate in order to reach a fixed point (in contrast to standard analyzers).

While ACC is a general approach, for concreteness we develop herein an incarnation of it in the context of (Constraint) Logic Programming, (C)LP, because this paradigm offers a good number of advantages, an important one being the maturity and sophistication of the analysis tools available for it. In particular, a wide range of analysis domains have been developed to infer properties such as data structure shape (with pointer sharing), bounds on data structure sizes,

and other operational variable instantiation properties, as well as procedure-level properties such as determinacy, termination, non-failure, and bounds on resource consumption, such as time or space cost (see, e.g., ²¹⁾ and its references).

Also for concreteness, we build on the algorithms of (and report on an implementation on) **CiaoPP** ²¹⁾, the abstract interpretation-based preprocessor of the **Ciao** multi-paradigm CLP system ⁹⁾. **CiaoPP** uses modular, incremental abstract interpretation as a fundamental tool to obtain information about programs. In **CiaoPP**, the semantic approximations thus produced have been applied to perform high- and low-level optimizations during program compilation, including transformations such as multiple abstract specialization, parallelization, partial evaluation, resource usage control, and program verification. More recently, novel and promising applications of such semantic approximations are being applied in the more general context of program development. We report on our extension of **CiaoPP** to incorporate ACC and on how this instantiation of ACC already shows promising results.

The article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some notation and preliminary notions on CLP and abstract interpretation. In Section 3, we present a general view of ACC. Section 4 describes the assertion language which is used to define our safety policy. Section 5 discusses the generation of program abstractions. In Section 6, we present the verification condition generator which attests compliance of the abstraction with respect to the safety policy. In Section 7, we introduce an abstract interpretation-based checker which validates the safety certificate in the consumer. Section 8 reports on some experiments performed in the **CiaoPP**-based implementation. Finally, Section 9 discusses the work presented in this article and related work.

§2 Preliminaries

We assume familiarity with constraint logic programming ²⁴⁾ (CLP) and the concepts of abstract interpretation ¹⁶⁾ which underlie most analyses in CLP. The remaining of this section introduces some notation and recalls preliminary concepts on these topics.

2.1 Constraint Logic Programming

Terms are constructed from variables (e.g., X) and functors (e.g., f). We denote by $\{X_1 \mapsto t_1, \dots, X_n \mapsto t_n\}$ the *substitution* σ with $\sigma(X_i) = t_i$ for all $i = 1, \dots, n$ with $X_i \neq X_j$ if $i \neq j$ and $\sigma(X) = X$ for any other variable

X , where t_i are terms. The *identity* substitution, which we denote by id is such that $\forall X id(X) = X$. A *renaming* is a substitution ρ for which there exists the inverse ρ^{-1} such that $\rho\rho^{-1} \equiv \rho^{-1}\rho \equiv id$. We say that a renaming ρ is a *renaming substitution* of term t_1 w.r.t. term t_2 if $t_2 = \rho(t_1)$.

A *literal* has the form $p(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ where p/n is a procedure name (predicate symbol), n is its arity and t_i are terms. Most real-life (C)LP programs use procedures which are not defined in the program (module) being developed. Thus, procedures are classified into *internal* and *external*. Internal procedures are defined in the current program (module), whereas external procedures are not. Examples of external procedures include the traditional “built-in” (predefined) procedures, such as constraints, basic input/output facilities (e.g., `open`). We will also consider as external procedures those defined in a different module, procedures written in another language, etc. We assume the existence of a boolean function `external` s.t. `external(p(t1, ..., tn))` succeeds iff the procedure p/n is external. A *goal* is a finite sequence of literals. A *rule* is of the form $H:-B$ where H , the *head*, is a literal and B , the *body*, is a possibly empty finite sequence of literals. A *CLP program*, or *program*, is a finite set of rules.

Example 2.1 (Running Example)

The main procedure, `create_streams/2`, of the following CLP program receives a list of numbers which correspond to certain file names, and returns in the second argument the list of file handlers (*streams*) associated to the (opened) files:

```

create_streams([], []).
create_streams([N|NL], [F|FL]):-
    number_codes(N, ChInN), app("/tmp/", ChInN, FName),
    safe_open(FName, write, F), create_streams(NL, FL).

app([], L, L).
app([X|Xs], L, [X|Y]):-
    app(Xs, L, Y).

safe_open(FName, Mode, F):-
    atom_codes(File, FName), open(File, Mode, F).

```

It defines the well-known list concatenation procedure `app/3` and uses the following external predicates. The call `number_codes(N, ChInN)` receives the number N and returns in `ChInN` the list of the ASCII codes of the characters comprising the representation of N as a decimal number. Then, it uses the well-known list concatenation procedure `app/3`. Note that lists are represented in this example

by using quoted strings. The call `atom_codes(File,Fname)` receives in `Fname` a list of ASCII codes and returns in `File` the atom (constant) made up of the corresponding characters. Also, a call such as `open(File,Mode,F)` opens the file named `File` and returns in `F` the stream associated to the file. The argument `Mode` can have any of the values: `read`, `write`, or `append`. Procedures `number_codes/2`, `atom_codes/2`, and `open/3` are ISO-standard Prolog procedures, and thus they are available in CiaoPP (in the `iso-prolog` library).

In the following, we assume that all rule heads are normalized, i.e., H is of the form $p(X_1, \dots, X_n)$ where X_1, \dots, X_n are distinct free variables. This is not restrictive since programs can always be normalized, and it will facilitate the presentation of the algorithms later. For instance, the procedure `create_streams` of Example 2.1 in normalized form is as follows.

```
create_streams(X,Y):- X=[],Y=[].
create_streams(X,Y):- X=[N|NL], Y=[F|FL],
    number_codes(N,ChInN), T="/tmp/",
    app(T,ChInN,Fname),Mode=write,
    safe_open(Fname,Mode,F), create_streams(NL,FL).
```

2.2 Abstract Interpretation

In *Abstract Interpretation* ¹⁶⁾, programs are interpreted over an *abstract domain* (D_α) which is simpler than the corresponding *concrete domain* (D). An abstract value is a finite representation of a possibly infinite set of actual values in the concrete domain. Our approach relies on the abstract interpretation theory ¹⁶⁾, where the set of all possible abstract semantic values which represents D_α is usually a complete lattice or cpo which is ascending chain finite. However, for this study, abstract interpretation is restricted to complete lattices over sets, both for the concrete $\langle 2^D, \subseteq \rangle$ and abstract $\langle D_\alpha, \sqsubseteq \rangle$ domains. Abstract values and sets of concrete values are related via a pair of monotonic mappings $\langle \alpha, \gamma \rangle$: *abstraction* $\alpha : 2^D \rightarrow D_\alpha$, and *concretization* $\gamma : D_\alpha \rightarrow 2^D$, such that $\forall x \in 2^D : \gamma(\alpha(x)) \supseteq x$ and $\forall y \in D_\alpha : \alpha(\gamma(y)) = y$. In general \sqsubseteq is induced by \subseteq and α . Similarly, the operations of *least upper bound* (\sqcup) and *greatest lower bound* (\sqcap) mimic those of 2^D in a precise sense.

In our framework, the *safety properties* that the execution of a program must satisfy are defined as abstract substitutions. This allows us to express properties in terms of abstract domains. In turn, different domains can be used for different safety properties. The abstract (or *description*) domain we use in

our examples is the following *regular type* domain ¹⁷⁾.

Example 2.2 (regular type domain)

We refer to the *regular type* domain as *eterms*, since it is the name it has in CiaoPP. Abstract substitutions in *eterms* ⁴⁴⁾, over a set of variables V , assign a *regular type* to each variable in V . We use in our examples `term` as the most general type (i.e., `term` $\equiv \top$ corresponds to all possible terms). We also allow parametric types such as `list(T)` which denotes lists whose elements are all of type T . Type `list` is equivalent to `list(term)`. Also, `list(T) \sqsubseteq list \sqsubseteq term` for any type T . The least general substitution \perp assigns the empty set of values to each variable and indicates that the corresponding program point is unreachable.

Apart from predefined types, in the *eterms* domain, the user can define regular types by means of *Regular Unary Logic* programs ²⁰⁾.^{*1} For instance, in the context of mobile code, it is a safety issue whether the code tries to access files which are not related to the application in the machine consuming the code. A very simple safety policy can be to enforce that the mobile code only accesses temporary files. In a UNIX system this can be controlled (under some assumptions) by ensuring that the file resides in the directory `/tmp/`. The following regular type `safe_name` defines this notion of safety, where the `regtype` declarations are used in CiaoPP to define new regular types:

```
:- regtype safe_name/1.
safe_name("/tmp/"||L) :- list(L,alphanum_code).

:- regtype alphanum_code/1.
alphanum_code(X) :- alpha_code(X).
alphanum_code(X) :- num_code(X).

:- regtype alpha_code/1.
alpha_code(X) :- member(X,"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwzyz").
alpha_code(X) :- member(X,"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ").
```

The regular type `num_code(X) :- member(X,"0123456789.eE+-")` is predefined in the system. The abstract property made up of substitution $\{X \mapsto \text{safe_name}\}$ expresses that X is bound to a string which starts with `/tmp/` followed by a list of alpha-numerical characters (we use `||` to denote list concatenation). In the following, we write simply `safe_name(X)` to represent it. The crucial point here is that `safe_names` cannot contain (back-)slashes. As a result, there is no way `safe_names` can access files outside the `/tmp/` directory.

^{*1} Additionally such types are inferred by the system independently of the pre- or user-defined types.

§3 A General View of Abstraction-Carrying Code

An abstract interpretation-based certifier is a function $\text{certifier} : \text{Prog} \times \text{ADom} \times \text{AInt} \rightarrow \text{ACert}$ which for a given program $P \in \text{Prog}$, an abstract domain $D_\alpha \in \text{ADom}$ and a safety policy $I_\alpha \in \text{AInt}$ generates a certificate $\text{Cert}_\alpha \in \text{ACert}$, by using an abstract interpreter for D_α , which entails that P satisfies I_α . This abstract safety specification I_α embodies the safety requirements, i.e., it is an expression of the consumer's safety expectations. Its formalization in our context is the main issue of Section 4. In the following, we denote that I_α and Cert_α are specifications given as abstract semantic values of D_α by using the same α . The basics for defining such certifiers (and their corresponding checkers) in ACC are summarized in the following five points and Equations:

Analysis. We consider the class of *fixed-point semantics* in which a (monotonic) semantic operator, S_P , is associated to each program P . The meaning of the program, $\llbracket P \rrbracket$, is defined as the least fixed point of the S_P operator, i.e., $\llbracket P \rrbracket = \text{lfp}(S_P)$. If S_P is continuous, the least fixed point is the limit of an iterative process involving at most ω applications of S_P starting from the bottom element of the lattice. Consider the operator S_P^α which is the abstract counterpart of S_P . Using abstract interpretation, we can usually only compute $\llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha$, as $\llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha = \text{lfp}(S_P^\alpha)$.

$$\text{analyze}(P, D_\alpha) = \text{lfp}(S_P^\alpha) = \llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha \quad (1)$$

Correctness of analysis ensures that $\llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha$ safely approximates $\llbracket P \rrbracket$, i.e., $\llbracket P \rrbracket \in \gamma(\llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha)$.

The generation of Equation (1) is the main issue of Section 5.

Verification Condition. Let Cert_α be a safe approximation of P . If an abstract safety specification I_α can be proved w.r.t. Cert_α , then P satisfies the safety policy and Cert_α is a valid certificate:

$$\text{Cert}_\alpha \text{ is a valid certificate for } P \text{ w.r.t. } I_\alpha \text{ if } \text{Cert}_\alpha \sqsubseteq I_\alpha \quad (2)$$

Equation (2) is explained in detail in Section 6.

Certifier. Together, equations (1) and (2) define a certifier which provides program fixpoints, $\llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha$, as certificates which entail a given safety policy, i.e., by taking $\text{Cert}_\alpha = \llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha$. Note that the two equations define the function certifier specified above.

Checking. A checker is a function $\text{checker} : \text{Prog} \times \text{ADom} \times \text{ACert} \rightarrow \text{bool}$ which for a program $P \in \text{Prog}$, an abstract domain $D_\alpha \in \text{ADom}$ and a certificate $\text{Cert}_\alpha \in \text{ACert}$ checks whether Cert_α is a fixpoint of S_P^α or not:

$$\text{check}(P, D_\alpha, \text{Cert}_\alpha) \text{ returns true iff } (S_P^\alpha(\text{Cert}_\alpha) \equiv \text{Cert}_\alpha) \quad (3)$$

The definition of a `check` function satisfying Equation (3) is the purpose of Section 7.

Verification Condition Regeneration. To retain the safety guarantees, the consumer must regenerate a trustworthy verification condition –Equation 2– and use the incoming certificate to test for adherence of the safety policy.

$$P \text{ is trusted iff } \text{Cert}_\alpha \sqsubseteq I_\alpha \quad (4)$$

A fundamental idea in ACC is that, while analysis –equation (1)– is an iterative process which may traverse (parts of) the abstraction more than once until the fixpoint is reached, checking –equation (3)– is guaranteed to be done in a single pass over the abstraction (a single application of S_P^α).

§4 An Assertion Language to Specify the Safety Policy

The aim of this section is to present the *safety policy* $I_\alpha \in \text{AInt}$ within the ACC approach. The purpose of a safety policy is to specify precisely the (abstract) conditions under which the execution of a program is considered safe. Assertions are syntactic objects which allow expressing a wide variety of high-level properties of (in our case CLP-) programs. Examples are assertions which state information on *entry points* to a program module, assertions which describe properties of predefined procedures (built-ins), assertions which provide some type declarations, cost bounds, etc. They will allow us to have an expressive class of safety policies in the context of (constraint) logic programs. Intuitively, we assume that a program will be accepted at the receiving end, provided all properties stated within assertions can be checked, i.e., the abstract specification I_α expressed in the assertions determines the safety policy. This can be a policy agreed a priori or exchanged dynamically.

The original assertion language ³⁷⁾ available in `CiaoPP` is composed of several assertion schemes. Among them, we only consider the following two schemes in AInt for the purpose of this article, which intuitively correspond to traditional pre- and postconditions on procedures:

$calls(B, \{\lambda_{Pre}^1; \dots; \lambda_{Pre}^n\})$: This assertion scheme is used to express properties which should hold in *any* call to a given procedure, in a similar way to the traditional *precondition*. B is a *procedure descriptor*, i.e., it has a procedure name (predicate symbol) as main functor and all arguments are distinct free variables, and λ_{Pre}^i , $i = 1, \dots, n$, are abstract properties of execution states. The resulting assertion should be interpreted as “in all activations of B *at least* one property λ_{Pre}^i should hold in the calling state.”

$success(B, [\lambda_{Pre},]\lambda_{Post})$: This assertion scheme is used to describe a *postcondition* which must hold on each success state for a given procedure. B is a procedure descriptor, and λ_{Pre} and λ_{Post} are abstract properties about execution states. λ_{Pre} is optional and must be evaluated w.r.t. the description at the calling state to the procedure while condition λ_{Post} is evaluated at the success state. If the optional λ_{Pre} is present, then λ_{Post} is only required to hold in those success states which correspond to call states satisfying λ_{Pre} . Note that several success assertions for the same procedure and with different λ_{Pre} may be given.

Therefore, abstract properties λ_{Pre} and λ_{Post} in assertions allow us to express $I_\alpha \in AInt$ as *conditions*, in terms of an abstract domain D_α , that the execution of a program must satisfy. Each condition is an abstract substitution corresponding to the variables in some literal.

In existing approaches, safety policies usually correspond to some variants of type safety (which may also control the correct access of memory or array bounds³⁵). In our system, the co-existence of several domains allows expressing a wide range of properties using the assertion language. They include several classes of safety policies based on modes, types, non-failure, termination, determinacy, non-suspension, non-floundering, cost bounds, and their combinations.

In general, it is the task of the compiler designer to define the safety policies associated with the predefined system procedures. In addition to these assertions, the user can optionally provide further assertions manually for user-defined procedures. As depicted in Figure 1, given an initial program P , we first define its Safety Policy I_α as a set of assertions AS in the context of an abstract domain D_α . The domain is appropriately chosen among a repertoire of abstract domains available in the system. The assertions are obtained from the assertions for system procedures and those provided by the user. Let us

<pre>calls(number_codes(X,Y), {(num(X);list(Y,num_code))}) calls(atom_codes(X,Y), {(constant(X);string(Y))}) calls(open(X,Y,Z), {constant(X),io_mode(Y)})</pre>
<pre>calls(safe_open(Fname,-,-), {safe_name(Fname)})</pre>
<pre>success(number_codes(X,Y), ⊤, {num(X),list(Y,num_code)}) success(atom_codes(X,Y), ⊤, {constant(X),string(Y)}) success(open(X,Y,Z), ⊤, {constant(X),io_mode(Y),stream(Z)})</pre>

Fig. 2 Assertions for the example

illustrate this process by means of an example.

Example 4.1 (Safety Policy)

Figure 2 shows the assertions which are relevant to the program in our running example. The first four rows correspond to `calls` assertions, whereas the last three are `success` assertions. Out of the four `calls`, the first three are predefined in the system. For example, the first one states that calls to `number_codes/2` have to be performed with the first argument bound to a number or the second argument bound to a list of `num_code`, which is a predefined type that includes the ASCII characters required for representing floating point (and integer) numbers as strings. The last `calls` assertion is for procedure `safe_open` and provides a simple way to guarantee that all subsequent calls to `open` are safe. It can be read as “the calling conventions for procedure `safe_open` require that the first argument be a `safe_name`.” The success assertion for `open` is predefined in our system and requires, upon success, the first variable to be of type `constant`, the second a proper `io_mode` and the last one of type `stream`.

In contrast to traditional approaches, assertions are not compulsory for every procedure. Thus, the user can decide how much effort to put into writing assertions: with more of them, the intended semantics (and thus the partial correctness) of the program is described more exhaustively and more possibilities arise for detecting problems. Indeed, pre- and post-conditions are frequently provided by programmers, specially in the case of libraries, since they are often easy to write and very useful not only for verification but also for example for generating program documentation. Nevertheless, the analysis algorithm is able to obtain safe approximations of the program behavior even if no assertions are given. This is not always the case in other approaches such as classical program verification, in which loop invariants are actually required. Such invariants are

hard to find and existing automated techniques are not always sufficient to infer them, so that often they have to be provided by hand.

Note that the three `success` assertions shown in the example correspond to library procedures. Such assertions can be verified beforehand, and indeed they are verified in our implementation assuming that calls to such procedures satisfy the corresponding `calls` assertions. Unfortunately, calls assertions for library procedures cannot be verified beforehand, since programs which use such procedures may do so incorrectly. Thus, in order to guarantee that the safety policy holds we only need to prove that the four *calls* assertions in Figure 2 hold.

§5 Generation of Program Abstractions

This section introduces part of the *certification* process, represented to the left of Figure 1, carried out by the producer, namely the generation of an *abstraction* $\llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha$ which safely approximates the behaviour of the program (Equation 1 in Section 3). The generation of the verification condition from this certificate (Equation 2) will be discussed in the next section.

5.1 The Analysis Graph

Global program analysis is becoming a practical tool in constraint logic program compilation in which information about calls, answers, and the effect of the constraint store on variables at different program points is computed statically^{23, 43, 33, 41, 10)}. Essentially, an analyzer returns an *abstraction* of P 's execution in terms of the abstract domain D_α . The underlying theory, formalized in terms of abstract interpretation¹⁶⁾, and the related implementation techniques are well understood for several general types of analysis and, in particular, for top-down analysis of Prolog^{18, 19, 8, 33, 28, 14)}. Several generic analysis engines, such as the one implemented in the CiaoPP system²²⁾, PLAI^{33, 31)}, GAIA¹⁴⁾, and the CLP(\mathcal{R}) analyzer²⁵⁾, facilitate the construction of such top-down analyzers. As shown in Figure 1 in principle the analyzer is domain-independent. This allows plugging in different abstract domains provided suitable interfacing functions are defined. From the user's point of view, it is sufficient to specify the particular abstract domain desired during the generation of the safety assertions. Different domains yield analyzers which provide different kinds of information, degrees of accuracy, and efficiency. The core of each generic abstract interpretation-based engine is an algorithm for efficient fixed-point computation^{31, 33, 13, 39)}.

In order to analyze a program, traditional (goal dependent) abstract interpreters for (C)LP programs, such as those referenced above, receive as input, in addition to the program and the abstract domain, a set S of *calling patterns*. Such calling patterns are pairs of the form $A : CP$ where A is a procedure descriptor and CP is an abstract substitution (i.e., a condition of the run-time bindings) of A expressed as $CP \in D_\alpha$.^{*2} Given a program P and a set S of calling patterns in the context of an abstract domain D_α , the analyzer constructs an *and-or graph* (or analysis graph) for S which can be viewed as an abstraction $\llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha$, i.e., a finite representation of the (possibly infinite) set of (possibly infinite) AND-OR trees explored by the concrete execution of initial calls described by S in P ⁸⁾. Finiteness of the program analysis graph (and thus termination of analysis) is achieved by considering abstract domains with certain characteristics (such as being finite, or of finite height, or without infinite ascending chains) or by the use of a *widening operator*¹⁶⁾.

Example 5.1

Consider our running example and assume that we are interested in analyzing it for the call `create_streams(X, Y)` with initial description $list(X, num)$, indicating that we wish to analyze it for any call to `create_streams/2` with the first argument being a list of numbers. In essence the analyzer must produce the *program analysis graph* given in Figure 3.

The graph has two sorts of nodes. Those which correspond to literals are called “OR-nodes”. The OR-node in the root:

$$list(X, num) \text{ create_streams}(X, Y) \text{ } list(X, num), list(Y, stream)$$

indicates that when the literal `create_streams(X, Y)` is called with description $list(X, num)$ the answer (or success) substitution computed is $\{list(X, num), list(Y, stream)\}$

Those nodes which correspond to rules are called “AND-nodes”. In Fig. 3, they appear within a dashed box and contain the head of the corresponding clause. Each AND-node has as children as many OR-nodes as literals there are in the body. We indicate with the symbol \square that the rule is a fact with no literals in the body. And the symbol \circ denotes that the code for this procedure

^{*2} In principle, calling patterns are only required for exported procedures. The analysis algorithm is able to generate them automatically for the remaining internal procedures. Nevertheless, they can still be automatically generated by assuming \top (i.e., no initial data) for all exported procedures (although the idea is to improve this information in the initial calling patterns).

5.2 The Analysis Algorithm

The aim of this section is two-fold. First, we introduce an analysis algorithm which computes an analysis graph. Second, we identify the fragment of the information stored in such graph which is sufficient in order to play the role of safety certificate, written as $Cert_\alpha = \llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha$.

The analysis algorithm presented is an extension of the generic analysis algorithm in ²²⁾ in order to handle (constraint) logic programs with *external* (including imported) procedures. For this, our analyzers rely again on assertion-based techniques ³⁷⁾. Intuitively, our analyzer *trusts* the information stated in the *success* assertions for external procedures by considering the answer pattern in them a safe approximation of the concrete answer patterns. In our algorithm, the analysis of external procedures is handled by the function `Atrust` which is introduced below. The details about analysis of modular programs can be found in ³⁸⁾ and are out of the scope of this article.

The program analysis graph is implicitly represented in the algorithm by means of two data structures, the *answer table* and the *dependency arc table*. Given the information in these, it is straightforward to construct the graph and the associated program point annotations. The answer table contains entries of the form $A : CP \mapsto AP$, where A is always a base form and AP and CP are abstract substitutions. This corresponds to OR-nodes in the analysis graph of the form ${}^{CP}A^{AP}$. A dependency arc is of the form $H_k : CP_0 \Rightarrow [CP_1] B_{k,i} : CP_2$. This is interpreted as follows: if the rule with H_k as head is called with description CP_0 then this causes literal $B_{k,i}$ to be called with description CP_2 . The remaining part CP_1 is the program annotation just before $B_{k,i}$ is reached and contains information about all variables in rule k . Note that the annotation CP_1 is not really necessary, as it could be recomputed, but it is included for efficient recomputation. As we will see below, dependency arcs are used for enforcing recomputation until a fixed point is reached.

Intuitively, the analysis algorithm is a graph traversal algorithm which places entries in the answer table and dependency arc table as new nodes and arcs in the program analysis graph are encountered. In order to guide computation, we need a third data structure for storing the *events* which are to be handled. Events are of three forms:

- $newcall(A : CP)$ which indicates that a new calling pattern for literal A with description CP has been encountered.
- $arc(H_k : CP_0 \Rightarrow [CP_1] B_{k,i} : CP_2)$ which indicates that the body of rule k

needs to be processed from position i , i.e., from body literal $B_{k,i}$ until the end of rule k , using the annotation CP_1 .

- $updated(A : CP)$ which indicates that the answer description to calling pattern A with description CP has been changed.

Rather than simply using a stack or a queue for storing events, which would result in a depth-first or a breadth-first traversal, respectively, we use a *prioritized event queue*. This allows capturing the sophisticated graph traversal strategies used in optimized fixed-point algorithms. For example, note that there are three different classes of events and we may be interested in assigning different priorities to each class of events. Coming up with an efficient strategy is out of the scope of this paper. A detailed discussion with concrete proposals can be found in ³⁹.

Our analysis algorithm is given in Figure 4. It is defined in terms of five abstract operations on the abstract domain D_α of interest:

- $Arestrict(CP, V)$ performs the abstract restriction of a description CP to the set of variables in the set V , denoted $vars(V)$;
- $Aextend(CP, V)$ extends the description CP to the variables in the set V ;
- $Atrust(A, CP)$ returns an answer pattern for an external procedure A which is a safe approximation of the concrete answer patterns for all call patterns described by CP ;
- $Aconj(CP_1, CP_2)$ performs the abstract conjunction of two descriptions;
- $Alub(CP_1, CP_2)$ performs the abstract disjunction of two descriptions.

Apart from the parametric description domain-dependent functions, the algorithm has several other undefined functions. The functions `add_event` and `next_event` respectively add an event to the priority queue and return (and delete) the event of highest priority.

When an event being added to the priority queue is already in the priority queue, a single event with the maximum of the priorities is kept in the queue. When an arc $H_k : CP \Rightarrow [CP']B_{k,i} : CP'$ is added to the dependency arc table, it replaces any other arc of the form $H_k : CP \Rightarrow [_]B_{k,i} : _$ in the table and the priority queue. Similarly when an entry $H_k : CP \mapsto AP$ is added to the answer table, it replaces any entry of the form $H_k : CP \mapsto _$. Note that the underscore ($_$) matches any description, and that there is at most one matching entry in the dependency arc table or answer table at any time. The function `initial_guess` returns an initial guess for the answer to a new calling pattern. The default value is \perp but if the calling pattern is more general than an already computed

<pre> analyze(<i>S</i>) foreach <i>A</i> : <i>CP</i> ∈ <i>S</i> add_event(newcall(<i>A</i> : <i>CP</i>)) main_loop() main_loop() while <i>E</i> := next_event() if (<i>E</i> = newcall(<i>A</i> : <i>CP</i>)) new_calling_pattern(<i>A</i> : <i>CP</i>) elseif (<i>E</i> = updated(<i>A</i> : <i>CP</i>)) add_dependent_rules(<i>A</i> : <i>CP</i>) elseif (<i>E</i> = arc(<i>R</i>)) process_arc(<i>R</i>) endwhile remove_useless_calls(<i>S</i>) new_calling_pattern(<i>A</i> : <i>CP</i>) foreach rule <i>A_k</i> :- <i>B_{k,1}</i>, ..., <i>B_{k,n_k}</i> <i>CP₀</i> := Aextend(<i>CP</i>, vars(<i>B_{k,1}</i>, ..., <i>B_{k,n_k}</i>)) <i>CP₁</i> := Arestrict(<i>CP₀</i>, vars(<i>B_{k,1}</i>)) add_event(arc(<i>A_k</i> : <i>CP</i> ⇒ [<i>CP₀</i>] <i>B_{k,1}</i> : <i>CP₁</i>)) <i>AP</i> := initial_guess(<i>A</i> : <i>CP</i>) if (<i>AP</i> ≠ ⊥) add_event(updated(<i>A</i> : <i>CP</i>)) add <i>A</i> : <i>CP</i> ↦ <i>AP</i> to answer table add_dependent_rules(<i>A</i> : <i>CP</i>) foreach arc of the form <i>H_k</i> : <i>CP₀</i> ⇒ [<i>CP₁</i>] <i>B_{k,i}</i> : <i>CP₂</i> in graph where there exists renaming σ s.t. $A : CP = (B_{k,i} : CP_2)\sigma$ add_event(arc(<i>H_k</i> : <i>CP₀</i> ⇒ [<i>CP₁</i>] <i>B_{k,i}</i> : <i>CP₂</i>)) </pre>	<pre> process_arc(<i>H_k</i> : <i>CP₀</i> ⇒ [<i>CP₁</i>] <i>B_{k,i}</i> : <i>CP₂</i>) if (not external(<i>B_{k,i}</i>)) add <i>H_k</i> : <i>CP₀</i> ⇒ [<i>CP₁</i>] <i>B_{k,i}</i> : <i>CP₂</i> to dependency arc table <i>W</i> := vars(<i>A_k</i> :- <i>B_{k,1}</i>, ..., <i>B_{k,n_k}</i>) <i>CP₃</i> := get_answer(<i>B_{k,i}</i> : <i>CP₂</i>, <i>CP₁</i>, <i>W</i>) if (<i>CP₃</i> ≠ ⊥ and <i>i</i> ≠ <i>n_k</i>) <i>CP₄</i> := Arestrict(<i>CP₃</i>, vars(<i>B_{k,i+1}</i>)) add_event(arc(<i>H_k</i> : <i>CP₀</i> ⇒ [<i>CP₃</i>] <i>B_{k,i+1}</i> : <i>CP₄</i>)) elseif (<i>CP₃</i> ≠ ⊥ and <i>i</i> = <i>n_k</i>) <i>AP₁</i> := Arestrict(<i>CP₃</i>, vars(<i>H_k</i>)) insert_answer_info(<i>H</i> : <i>CP₀</i> ↦ <i>AP₁</i>) get_answer(<i>L</i> : <i>CP₂</i>, <i>CP₁</i>, <i>W</i>) <i>AP₀</i> := lookup_answer(<i>L</i> : <i>CP₂</i>) <i>AP₁</i> := Aextend(<i>AP₀</i>, <i>W</i>) return Aconj(<i>CP₁</i>, <i>AP₁</i>) lookup_answer(<i>A</i> : <i>CP</i>) if (there exists a renaming σ s.t. $\sigma(A : CP) \mapsto AP$ in answer table) return $\sigma^{-1}(AP)$ elseif (not external(<i>A</i>)) add_event(newcall($\sigma(A : CP)$)) where σ is a renaming s.t. $\sigma(A)$ is in base form return ⊥ else % external(<i>A</i>) <i>AP</i> := Atrust(<i>A</i>, <i>CP</i>) add (<i>A</i> : <i>CP</i> ↦ <i>AP</i>) to answer table return <i>AP</i> insert_answer_info(<i>H</i> : <i>CP</i> ↦ <i>AP</i>) <i>AP₀</i> := lookup_answer(<i>H</i> : <i>CP</i>) <i>AP₁</i> := Alub(<i>AP</i>, <i>AP₀</i>) if (<i>AP₀</i> ≠ <i>AP₁</i>) add (<i>H</i> : <i>CP</i> ↦ <i>AP₁</i>) to answer table add_event(updated(<i>H</i> : <i>CP</i>)) </pre>
--	---

Fig. 4 Fixed-point Analyzer

call then its current value may be returned.

The algorithm centers around the processing of events on the priority queue in `main_loop`, which repeatedly removes the highest priority event and calls the appropriate event-handling function. When all events are processed it calls `remove_useless_calls`. This procedure traverses the dependency graph given by the dependency arcs from the initial calling patterns S and marks those entries in the dependency arc and answer table which are reachable. Those remaining are removed.

The function `new_calling_pattern` initiates processing of the rules in the definition of the internal literal A , by adding arc events for each of the first literals of these rules, and determines an initial answer for the calling pattern and places this in the table. The function `add_dependent_rules` adds arc events for each dependency arc which depends on the calling pattern $A : CP$ for which

the answer has been updated. The function `process_arc` performs the core of the analysis. It performs a single step of the left-to-right traversal of a rule body. If the literal $B_{k,i}$ is not for an external procedure, the arc is added to the dependency arc table. The current answer for the call $B_{k,i} : CP_2$ is conjoined with the description CP_1 from the program point immediately before $B_{k,i}$ to obtain the description for the program point after $B_{k,i}$. This is either used to generate a new arc event to process the next literal in the rule if $B_{k,i}$ is not the last literal; otherwise the new answer for the rule is combined with the current answer in `insert_answer_info`. The function `get_answer` processes a literal. The current answer to that literal for the current description is looked up; then this answer is extended to the variables in the rule the literal occurs in and conjoined with the current description. The function `lookup_answer` first looks up an answer for the given calling pattern in the answer table and if it is not found and the procedure is local, it places a *newcall* event. Otherwise (the procedure is external), it uses `Atrust` to obtain a safe answer pattern. Finally, `insert_answer_info`, updates the answer table entry when a new answer is found.

Theorem 5.1 (correctness ²²⁾)

For a program P and calling patterns S , the analysis algorithm of Figure 4 returns an answer table and dependency arc table which represents the least program analysis graph of P and S .

A central idea in ACC is that, for certifying program safety, it suffices to send the information stored in the analysis answer table. The theory of abstract interpretation guarantees that the answer table is a safe approximation of the runtime behavior (see ^{8, 22, 39} for details). In contrast to this analysis algorithm, a simple checker can be designed for validating the answer table without requiring the use of the arc dependency table at all (as we show in Sect. 7).

5.3 An Example

The following example illustrates the operation of the fixed-point algorithm. It shows how the `create_streams` program is analyzed, to obtain the program analysis graph shown in Figure 3. We use in our example well-known abstract operations for a regular type domain, in particular, the operations formalized in ⁴⁴⁾ for the *eterms* domain described in Example 2.2. For the analysis of library procedures, we assume that the parametric routine `Atrust` returns the abstract descriptions which appear in the three `success` assertions shown in Fig-

ure 2 for the corresponding library procedures. This can be done safely because, as already mentioned, such `success` assertions have been verified beforehand.

Example 5.2

Analysis begins from an initial set S of calling patterns. In our example S contains the single calling pattern `create_streams(X,Y):list(X,num)`. For brevity, variables which do not appear in abstract substitutions are assumed to be “`term`”. Also $nil(X)$ indicates that X is the empty list. The first step in the algorithm is to add the initial calling patterns as a newcall event to the priority queue. After this the priority queue contains

$$newcall(\text{create_streams}(X,Y):list(X,num))$$

and the answer and dependency arc tables are empty. The *newcall* event is taken from the event queue and processed as follows: for each rule defining `create_streams`, an arc is added to the priority queue which indicates the rule body which must be processed from the initial literal. An entry for the new calling pattern is added to the answer table with an initial guess of \perp as the answer. The data structures are now:

priority queue:

$$arc(\text{create_streams}(X,Y):list(X,num) \Rightarrow [list(X,num)] \text{ X}=[] : list(X,num))$$

$$arc(\text{create_streams}(X,Y):list(X,num) \Rightarrow [list(X,num)] \text{ X}=[N|NL] : list(X,num))$$

answer table:

$$\text{create_streams}(X,Y):list(X,num) \mapsto \perp$$

dependency arc table:

no entries

An arc on the event queue is now selected for processing, say the first. The routine `get_answer` is called to find the answer pattern to the literal $\text{X}=[]$ with description $list(X,num)$. As the literal is an external constraint, the parametric routine `Atrust` is used. It returns the answer pattern $\{list(X,num), nil(X)\}$. A new arc is added to the priority queue which indicates that the second literal in the rule body must be processed. The priority queue is now

$$arc(\text{create_streams}(X,Y):list(X,num) \Rightarrow [list(X,num), nil(X)] \text{ Y}=[] : \{ \})$$

$$arc(\text{create_streams}(X,Y):list(X,num) \Rightarrow [list(X,num)] \text{ X}=[N|NL] : list(X,num))$$

The answer and dependency arc table remain the same.

Again, an arc on the event queue is selected for processing, say the

first. As before, `get_answer` and `Atrust` are called to get the next annotation $\{list(X, num), nil(X), nil(Y)\}$. This time, as there are no more literals in the body, the entry for `create_streams(X,Y):list(X,num)` in the answer table is updated. `Alub` is used to find the least upper bound of the new answer $\{list(X,num), nil(X), nil(Y)\}$ with the old answer \perp . This gives $\{list(X,num), nil(X), nil(Y)\}$. The entry in the answer table is updated, and an *updated* event is placed on the priority queue. The data structures are now:

priority queue:

`updated(create_streams(X,Y):list(X,num))`
`arc(create_streams(X,Y):list(X,num) ⇒`
`[list(X,num)] X=[N|NL]:list(X,num))`

answer table:

`create_streams(X,Y):list(X,num) ↦ {list(X,num), nil(X), nil(Y)}`

dependency arc table:

no entries

The *updated* event can now be processed. As there are no entries in the dependency arc table, nothing in the current program analysis graph depends on the answer to this call, so nothing needs to be recomputed. The priority queue now contains

`arc(create_streams(X,Y):list(X,num) ⇒`
`[list(X,num)] X=[N|NL]:list(X,num))`

The answer and dependency arc table remain the same. Similarly to before we process the arc, giving rise to the new priority queue

`arc(create_streams(X,Y):list(X,num) ⇒`
`[list(X,num), num(N), list(NL,num)] Y=[F|FL]:{ }).`

The arc is processed to give the priority queue

`arc(create_streams(X,Y):list(X,num) ⇒`
`[list(X,num), num(N), list(NL,num), Y = [F|FL]]`
`number_codes(N,ChInN):num(N)`

Note that `CiaoPP` creates the regular type `rt2` to represent a term whose top-level functor is a list constructed with `F` as head and `FL` as tail. For simplicity, we just write this description as `Y=[F|FL]` in the following.

This time, because `number_codes(N,ChInN)` is an external literal, the parametric routine `Atrust` is used and no dependency is stored (as success patterns for external procedures are never updated). As a result, the data structures are now:

priority queue:

$$\text{arc}(\text{create_streams}(X, Y) : \text{list}(X, \text{num}) \Rightarrow [\text{list}(X, \text{num}), \text{num}(N), \\ \text{list}(NL, \text{num}), Y = [F|FL], \text{list}(ChInN, \text{num_code})] \quad T = "/tmp/" : \{ \})$$

answer table:

$$\text{create_streams}(X, Y) : \text{list}(X, \text{num}) \mapsto \text{list}(X, \text{num}), \text{nil}(X), \text{nil}(Y) \\ \text{number_codes}(N, ChInN) : \text{num}(N) \mapsto \text{num}(N), \text{list}(ChInN, \text{num_code})$$

dependency arc table:

no entries

Following the analysis, we process the unique arc in the priority queue, obtaining the new priority queue:

priority queue:

$$\text{arc}(\text{create_streams}(X, Y) : \text{list}(X, \text{num}) \Rightarrow [\text{list}(X, \text{num}), \text{num}(N), \\ \text{list}(NL, \text{num}), Y = [F|FL], \text{list}(ChInN, \text{num_code}), T = "/tmp/"] \\ \text{app}(T, ChInN, Fname) : T = "/tmp/", \text{list}(ChInN, \text{num_code}))$$

Similarly as done so far, and skipping the intermediate steps, we obtain finally the following data structures in which, the dependency arc table contains a different arc for each one of the literals in the second rule of `create_streams` which are not external.

priority queue:

$$\text{arc}(\text{create_streams}(X, Y) : \text{list}(X, \text{num}) \Rightarrow CP \\ \text{create_streams}(NL, FL) : \text{list}(NL, \text{num}))$$

answer table:

$$\text{create_streams}(X, Y) : \text{list}(X, \text{num}) \mapsto \{\text{list}(X, \text{num}), \text{nil}(X), \text{nil}(Y)\} \\ \text{number_codes}(N, ChInN) : \text{num}(N) \mapsto \{\text{num}(N), \text{list}(ChInN, \text{num_code})\} \\ \text{app}(T, ChInN, Fname) : \{\text{list}(ChInN, \text{num_code}), T = "/tmp/"\} \mapsto \\ \{\text{list}(ChInN, \text{num_code}), T = "/tmp/", sf(Fname)\} \\ \text{safe_open}(Fname, Mode, F) : \{sf(Fname), Mode = write\} \mapsto \\ \{sf(Fname), Mode = write, stream(F)\} \\ \text{atom_codes}(File, Fname) : sf(Fname) \mapsto \{\text{constant}(File), sf(Fname)\}$$

$$\text{open}(\text{File}, \text{Mode}, \text{F}) : \{ \text{constant}(\text{File}), \text{Mode} = \text{write} \} \mapsto \\ \{ \text{constant}(\text{File}), \text{Mode} = \text{write}, \text{stream}(\text{F}) \}$$

where

$$CP = [\text{list}(X, \text{num}), \text{num}(N), \text{list}(NL, \text{num}), Y = [F|FL], \\ \text{list}(\text{ChInN}, \text{num_code}), \text{sf}(\text{Fname}), \text{constant}(\text{File}), \\ \text{Mode} = \text{write}, \text{stream}(\text{F}), T = \text{"/tmp/" }]$$

It is interesting to note that CiaoPP creates the auxiliary type:

$$\text{sf}(\text{"/tmp/" || A}) : -\text{list}(A, \text{num_code}).$$

to represent strings which start with the prefix `"/tmp/"` and continue with a list of type `num_code`. Since all `num_codes` are also `alphanum_codes`, it is clear that `sf` \sqsubseteq `safe_name`. This will allow our system to infer that calls to `open` performed within this program satisfy the simple safety policy discussed in Example 4.1. Therefore, the information stored in the answer table is sufficient to attest the safety policy. Also, we use the notation $\text{Var} = \text{constant}$ to denote that the system generates a new type whose only element is this constant, as it happens for `write`, in the entries for `safe_open` and `open` and, for `"/tmp/"`, in the entry for `app`.

Now, the call `get_answer` for the recursive call `create_streams(NL, FL) : list(NL, num)` is made. The answer table is looked up to find the answer and, appropriately renamed and restricted to the variables in the call, gives $AP_0 = \{ \text{nil}(NL), \text{nil}(FL), \text{list}(NL, \text{num}) \}$. This description is extended to all variables (no change) and then conjoined with CP to give the next annotation $\{ \text{nil}(X), \text{nil}(Y), \text{list}(X, \text{num}), \text{list}(Y, \text{stream}) \}$. We take the least upper bound of this answer with the old answer in the table, giving $\{ \text{list}(X, \text{num}), \text{list}(Y, \text{stream}) \}$. The answer table will replace the current annotation for `create_streams(X, Y) : list(X, num)` by: $\text{create_streams}(X, Y) : \text{list}(X, \text{num}) \mapsto \{ \text{list}(X, \text{num}), \text{list}(Y, \text{stream}) \}$ adding the processed arc to the dependency arc table.

As the answer has changed, an *updated* event is added to the priority queue. The priority queue contains:

$$\text{updated}(\text{create_streams}(X, Y) : \text{list}(X, \text{num}))$$

The *updated* event is processed by looking in the dependency arc table for all arcs which have a body literal which is a variant of `create_streams(X, Y) : list(X,`

num) and adding these arcs to the priority queue to be reprocessed. There is only one (the last processed arc). After reprocessing this arc we obtain as answer $\{list(X, num), list(Y, stream)\}$. Taking the least upper bound of this with the old answer, the result is identical to the old answer, hence no *updated* event is added to the priority queue. As there are no events on the priority queue, the analysis terminates.

As a result of the whole analysis, the answer table computed by CiaoPP contains (among others) these entries:

Procedure	Calling Pattern	Success Pattern
<code>create_streams(A,B)</code>	<code>list(A,num)</code>	<code>list(A,num),list(B,stream)</code>
<code>number_codes(A,B)</code>	<code>num(A)</code>	<code>num(A),list(B,num_code)</code>
<code>app(A,B,C)</code>	<code>A="/tmp/", list(B,num_code)</code>	<code>A="/tmp/", list(B,num_code),sf(C)</code>
<code>safe_open(A,B,C)</code>	<code>sf(A),B=write</code>	<code>sf(A),B=write,stream(C)</code>
<code>atom_codes(A,B)</code>	<code>sf(B)</code>	<code>constant(A),sf(B)</code>
<code>open(A,B,C)</code>	<code>constant(A),B=write</code>	<code>constant(A),B=write,stream(C)</code>

We show in the next section that the information stored in the above table can be taken as $Cert_\alpha$, i.e., $Cert_\alpha = AT$, because it is sufficient to certify that the mobile code is safe according to the policy defined in Example 4.1.

In order to increase accuracy, analyzers are usually *multivariant* on calls (see, e.g., ²²). Indeed, though not visible in this example, CiaoPP incorporates a multivariant analysis, i.e., more than one triple $\langle A : CP_1 \mapsto AP_1 \rangle, \dots, \langle A : CP_n \mapsto AP_n \rangle$, $n > 1$ with $CP_i \neq AP_i$ for some i, j may be computed for the same procedure descriptor A .

§6 The Verification Condition

As part of the certification process carried out by the code producer, the verification condition generator (VCGen in Fig. 1) extracts, from the initial assertions I_α and the abstraction $Cert_\alpha$, a *Verification Condition* (VC) which can be proved only if the execution of the code does not violate the safety policy. In particular, we are interested in studying the implications of comparing the intended safety policy described in Section 4, denoted I_α , with the program abstraction described in Section 5, denoted $\llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha$. Therefore, VCGen generates a VC which encodes the comparison $\llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha \sqsubseteq I_\alpha$ in Equation (2). If VC can be proved (marked as OK in Fig. 1), then the certificate (i.e., the abstraction) is sent together with the program P to the code consumer.

Definition 6.1 (VC – verification condition)

Let AT be an analysis answer table computed for a program P and a set of calling patterns S in the abstract domain D_α . Let I be an assertion. Then, the verification condition, $VC(I, AT)$, for I w.r.t. AT is defined as follows:

$$VC(I, AT) ::= \begin{cases} \bigwedge_{\langle A:CP \mapsto AP \rangle \in AT} (\rho(CP) \sqsubseteq \lambda_{Prec}^1 \vee \dots \vee \rho(CP) \sqsubseteq \lambda_{Prec}^n) & \text{if } I = \text{calls}(B, \{\lambda_{Prec}^1; \dots; \lambda_{Prec}^n\}) \\ \bigwedge_{\langle A:CP \mapsto AP \rangle \in AT} \rho(CP) \sqcap \lambda_{Prec} = \perp \vee \rho(AP) \sqsubseteq \lambda_{Post} & \text{if } I = \text{success}(B, \lambda_{Prec}, \lambda_{Post}) \end{cases}$$

where ρ is a variable renaming substitution of A w.r.t. B .

If I_α is a finite set of assertions, then its verification condition, $VC(I_\alpha, AT)$, is the conjunction of the verification conditions of the elements of I_α .

Roughly speaking, the VC generated according to Def. 6.1 is a conjunction of boolean expressions (possibly containing disjunctions) whose validity ensures the consistency of a set of assertions w.r.t. the answer table computed by *Analysis*, see Equation (1). It distinguishes two different cases depending on the kind of assertion. For *calls* assertions, the VC requires that at least one precondition λ_{Prec}^i be a safe approximation of each existing abstract calling patterns for the literal B . In the case of *success* assertions, there are two cases for them to hold. The first one indicates that the precondition is never satisfied and, thus, the assertion trivially holds (and the postcondition does not need to be tested). The second corresponds to the case in which the success substitutions computed by analysis for the procedure are equal or more particular than the one required by the assertion.

Example 6.1 (Verification Condition)

Consider the answer table generated in Example 5.2 and the *calls* and *success* assertions of Figure 2. According to Definition 6.1, the VC is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{num}(X) &\sqsubseteq (\text{num}(X); \text{list}(Y, \text{num_code})) \wedge \\ \text{sf}(Y) &\sqsubseteq (\text{constant}(X); \text{string}(Y)) \wedge \\ \text{constant}(X), Y = \text{write} &\sqsubseteq \text{constant}(X), \text{io_mode}(Y) \wedge \\ \text{sf}(X) &\sqsubseteq \text{safe_name}(X) \end{aligned}$$

Each conjunct corresponds to a *calls* assertion in Fig. 2 in the same order they appear there. As already mentioned, *success* assertions for predefined proce-

dures are verified beforehand.

The validity of the whole conjunction can be easily proved by taking into account the following (trivial) relations between the elements in the domain:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{sf}(X) &\sqsubseteq \mathbf{string}(X) \\ X = \mathbf{write} &\sqsubseteq \mathbf{io_mode}(X) \end{aligned}$$

Note that the first two conjuncts contain a disjunction in the right hand condition. In the second one, the condition $\mathbf{sf}(Y) \sqsubseteq (\mathbf{constant}(X); \mathbf{string}(Y))$ holds because $\mathbf{sf}(Y) \sqsubseteq \mathbf{string}(Y)$.

Therefore, upon creating the answer table and generating the VC, the validity of the whole boolean condition is checked by resolving each conjunct separately. Note that each conjunct consists of comparisons of pairs of abstract substitutions, which simply return either true or false but do not compute any substitution. This validation may yield three different possible outcomes: i) the VC is indeed checked and the answer table is considered a valid abstraction (marked as OK), ii) it is disproved, and thus the certificate is not valid and the code is definitely not safe to run (we should obviously correct the program before continuing the process); iii) it can neither be proved nor disproved. The latter case happens because some properties are undecidable and the analyzer performs approximations in order to always terminate. Therefore, it may not be able to infer precise enough information to verify the conditions. The user can then provide a more refined description of initial calling patterns or choose a different, finer-grained, domain. Although, it is not shown in the picture, in both the ii) and iii) cases, the certification process needs to be restarted until achieving a VC which meets i).

The following theorem states the soundness of the VC. Intuitively, it amounts to saying that if the VC holds, then the execution of the program will preserve all safety assertions. Following the notation of ³⁴⁾, we write $\triangleright VC$ when VC is valid.

Theorem 6.1 (Soundness of the Verification Condition)

Let AT be an analysis answer table for a program P and a set of calling patterns S in an abstract domain D_α (as defined in Figure 4). Let I_α be a set of assertions. Let $VC(I_\alpha, AT)$ be the verification condition for I_α w.r.t. AT (generated as stated in Def. 6.1). If $\triangleright VC(I_\alpha, AT)$, then P satisfies all assertions in I_α for all computations described by S .

This result directly derives from the fact that the static analysis algorithm computes a safe approximation of the states reached during computation (see Theorem 5.1).

§7 Checking Safety in the Consumer

The checking process performed by the consumer is illustrated on the right hand side of Figure 1. Initially, the supplier sends the program P together with the certificate to the consumer. To retain the safety guarantees, the consumer can provide a new set of assertions, denoted I'_α , which specifies the **Safety Policy** required by this particular consumer. It should be noted that ACC is very flexible in that it allows different implementations on the way the safety policy is provided. Clearly, the same assertions used by the producer, denoted I_α , can be sent to the consumer. But, more interestingly, the consumer can decide to impose a weaker safety condition, i.e., $I_\alpha \sqsubseteq I'_\alpha$, which can be proved with the submitted abstraction since $\llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha \sqsubseteq I_\alpha$. Also, the imposed safety condition can be stronger, i.e., $I'_\alpha \sqsubseteq I_\alpha$ and it may not be provable if it is not implied by the current abstraction $\llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha$ (which means that the code would be rejected). From the provided assertions, the consumer must generate again a trustworthy VC and use the incoming certificate to efficiently check that the VC holds. Thus, in the *validation* process, a code consumer not only checks the validity of the answer table (Equation 3) but it also (re-)generates a trustworthy VC (Equation 4). The validation of AT in Equation 3 is carried out by the **Analysis Checker**. The re-generation of VC in Equation 4 (and its corresponding validation) is identical to the process already discussed in the previous section. Therefore, this section describes only the first part of the validation process.

7.1 Fixed-point Checking

Although global analysis is now routinely used as a practical tool, it is still unacceptable to run the whole *Analysis* to validate the certificate since it involves considerable cost. One of the main reasons is that the analysis algorithm is an iterative process which often computes answers (repeatedly) for the same call due to possible updates introduced by further iterations. At each iteration, the algorithm has to manipulate rather complex data structures—which involve performing updates, lookups, etc.—until the fixed point is reached. The whole validation process is centered around the following observation:

The checking algorithm can be defined as a very simplified “one-pass”

analyzer.

The *Analysis* process can be understood as: $Analysis = fixedpoint(analy-
sis_step)$. I.e., a process which repeatedly performs a traversal of the analy-
sis graph (denoted by *analysis_step*) until the computed information does not
change. The idea is that the simple, non-iterative, *analysis_step* process can play
the role of abstract interpretation-based checker (or simply analysis checker). In
other words, $check \equiv analysis_step$. Intuitively, since the certification process
should provide a correct fixed-point result (i.e., $\llbracket P \rrbracket_\alpha$) as certificate, an additional
analysis pass over this fixed point should not change the result. Otherwise, the
current answer table is not a valid abstraction of the program. Thus, in our con-
text, as long as the answer table is valid, one single execution of *analysis_step*
is required to validate the certificate, as stated in Equation (3).

7.2 The Checking Algorithm

The next definition presents our *abstract interpretation-based checking*
algorithm. It receives as an additional input a $Cert_\alpha$ (which is the analysis
fixed point). In a single traversal, it constructs a program analysis graph by
using the information in $Cert_\alpha$. The algorithm is devised as a graph traversal
procedure which places entries in a *local* answer table, AT , as new nodes in the
program analysis graph are encountered. Thus, it handles two distinct answer
tables: the local AT + the incoming $Cert_\alpha$. The final goal of the checking is
to reconstruct the analysis graph and compare the results with the information
stored in $Cert_\alpha$. As long as $Cert_\alpha$ is valid, both results coincide and, thus, the
certificate is guaranteed to be valid w.r.t. the program.

Definition 7.1 (Analysis Checker)

Let P be a normalized program and S be a set of calling patterns in the abstract
domain D_α . Let $Cert_\alpha$ be an answer table (or safety certificate) as defined in
Figure 4. The validation of $Cert_\alpha$ is performed by the procedure `check` depicted
in Figure 5. The algorithm uses a local answer table, AT , to compute the results
(initially it does not contain any entry).

Following the presentation of the analysis algorithm in Section 5.2, we assume
that the program P and the answer table are global parameters throughout the
algorithm. The checking algorithm proceeds as follows: as in the analysis algo-
rithm, the procedure `process_arc` is aimed at computing the resulting description
 CP_a after processing a given literal $B_{k,i}$. The computed result is used to process

```

check( $S, Cert_\alpha$ )
  foreach  $A : CP \in S$ 
    process_node( $A : CP, Cert_\alpha$ )
  return Valid

process_node( $A : CP, Cert_\alpha$ )
  if ( $\exists$  a renaming  $\sigma$  s.t.  $\sigma(A : CP \mapsto AP)$  in  $Cert_\alpha$ )
    then add ( $A : CP \mapsto AP$ ) to AT
    else return Error
  if (not external( $A$ ))
    foreach rule  $A_k \leftarrow B_{k,1}, \dots, B_{k,n_k}$  in  $P$ 
       $W := vars(A_k, B_{k,1}, \dots, B_{k,n_k})$ 
       $CP_b := Aextend(CP, vars(B_{k,1}, \dots, B_{k,n_k}))$ 
       $CPR_b := Arestrict(CP_b, B_{k,1})$ 
      foreach  $B_{k,i}$  in the rule body  $i = 1, \dots, n_k$ 
         $CP_a := process\_arc(B_{k,i} : CPR_b, CP_b, W, Cert_\alpha)$ 
        if ( $i <> n_k$ ) then  $CPR_a := Arestrict(CP_a, var(B_{k,i+1}))$ 
         $CP_b := CP_a$ 
         $CPR_b := CPR_a$ 
       $AP_1 := Arestrict(CP_a, vars(A_k))$ 
       $AP_2 := Alub(AP_1, \sigma^{-1}(AP))$ 
      if  $AP <> AP_2$  then return Error
    else % external( $A$ )
       $AP_1 := Atrust(A, CP)$ 
      if  $\sigma^{-1}(AP) <> AP_1$  then return Error

process_arc( $B_{k,i} : CPR_b, CP_b, W, Cert_\alpha$ )
  if ( $\nexists$  a renaming  $\sigma$  s.t.  $\sigma(B_{k,i} : CPR_b \mapsto AP')$  in AT)
    then
      process_node ( $B_{k,i} : CPR_b, Cert_\alpha$ )
       $AP_1 := Aextend(\rho^{-1}(AP), W)$  where  $\rho$  is a renaming s.t.
         $\rho(B_{k,i} : CPR_b \mapsto AP)$  in AT
       $CP_a := Aconj(CP_b, AP_1)$ 
      return  $CP_a$ 

```

Fig. 5 Abstract Interpretation-based Checking in CiaoPP

the next literal in the rule when $B_{k,i}$ is not the last one. Otherwise, the computed result constitutes indeed the computed answer for the rule. The difference w.r.t. the analyzer is that the answer is *combined* with the corresponding answer supplied by the certification process in $Cert_\alpha$. If $Cert_\alpha$ is valid, the comparison should hold; otherwise the process prompts an error and the program is not safe to run. Therefore, no control structure is needed in order to guarantee that a fixed point is reached. This eliminates the need for the “event queue” of the analysis algorithm in Fig. 4. Moreover, since only one traversal of the analysis graph is to be performed, no detailed dependency information is required. This eliminates the need for the “dependency arc table” of the analysis algorithm. As a result, `check` is a suitable procedure for determining the validity of the certificate.

The following theorem ensures that algorithm `check` is able to validate safety certificates which are stored in a valid analysis answer table.

Theorem 7.1 (partial correctness)

Let P be a program, let S be a set of calling patterns in an abstract domain D_α . Let $Cert_\alpha$ be an answer table for P and S as defined in Figure 4. Then, `check`($S, Cert_\alpha$) terminates and, if it returns `Valid`, then $Cert_\alpha$ is an abstraction of P and S .

The theorem is implied by the definition of fixed point and the fact that `check` is a single pass of a correct *Analysis* algorithm ²²⁾. Indeed, it is immediate to see that algorithm `check` has been obtained as a simplification of the algorithm *Analysis*.

Another issue is the efficiency of the checking algorithm. Our point to justify an efficient behavior of `check` for validating an answer table is that it performs a single graph traversal. Indeed, for a regular type domain, ¹²⁾ demonstrates that directional type-checking for logic programs is fixed-parameter linear. Section 8 reports experimental evidence of efficiency issues.

7.3 An Example

We describe the more representative steps that algorithm `check` performs in order to validate the answer table of Example 5.2.

Example 7.1

Consider the answer table, called $Cert_\alpha$, of Example 5.2. First, procedure

`process_node` looks up an answer for the initial calling pattern in $Cert_\alpha$ and adds the entry

$\langle \text{create_streams}(X, Y) : \text{list}(X, num) \mapsto AP = \{\text{list}(X, num), \text{list}(Y, stream)\} \rangle$

to the answer table AT (note that, for short, we use AP to denote this particular answer pattern). Since there are two rules defining `create_streams` the outermost loop performs two iterations:

Iter 1. We start by describing the processing of the first rule (although the order is irrelevant). Since the first literal $X=[]$ in the rule body is a constraint, its description is computed within procedure `process_arc` by adding its abstract description, i.e., $\{\text{nil}(X)\}$, to the initial description $\{\text{list}(X, num)\}$, resulting in $\{\text{nil}(X), \text{list}(X, num)\}$. Similarly, the analysis for the second constraint adds $\{\text{nil}(Y)\}$ to the former description producing $\{\text{nil}(X), \text{nil}(Y), \text{list}(X, num)\}$. Upon exiting the innermost loop, the disjunction of this description with the answer stored in $Cert_\alpha$ is calculated:

$AP_2 := \text{A lub}(\{\text{nil}(X), \text{nil}(Y), \text{list}(X, num)\}, AP)$

since $\text{nil}(X) \sqsubseteq \text{list}(X, num)$ and $\text{nil}(Y) \sqsubseteq \text{list}(Y, stream)$, then $AP_2 = AP$. Thus, the certificate holds for this rule.

Iter 2. In the second iteration, we find eight literals in the rule body. Thus, the innermost loop performs the following eight steps. The first two traversals deal with the constraints for X and Y , and are similar to **Iter 1**. They produce the calling pattern

$\{\text{list}(X, num), \text{num}(N), \text{list}(NL, num), Y = [F|FL]\}$

The next literal, `number_codes`, in the rule body is an external procedure, thus, `process_node` uses the parametric routine `Atrust` which gives the answer $\{\text{num}(N), \text{list}(\text{ChInN}, \text{num_code})\}$ for it. This answer is conjoined with the description of the program point immediately before the literal, i.e.:

$\{\text{list}(X, num), \text{num}(N), \text{list}(NL, num), Y = [F|FL], \text{list}(\text{ChInN}, \text{num_code})\}$

The remaining intermediate literals are dealt in a similar way (see Example 5.2 for more specific details). Let us just consider the processing of the recursive call to `create_streams`, for which we get as final description:

$CP = [\text{list}(X, num), \text{num}(N), \text{list}(NL, num), Y = [F|FL],$
 $\text{list}(\text{ChInN}, \text{num_code}), \text{sf}(Fname), \text{constant}(File), \text{Mode} = \text{write},$
 $\text{stream}(F), T = "/tmp/"]$

Now, `process_node` finds out that AT already contains an answer pattern for this procedure. Then, both calling patterns are conjoined: $CP_a := Aconj(CP, AP)$ and restricted to variables X and Y , obtaining $CP_a = AP$ as final result. Upon return from `process_arc`, it performs the disjunction of the computed answer with the answer supplied by $Cert_\alpha$: $AP_2 := Alub(CP_a, AP)$. Since $CP_a = AP$ and also the result, $AP_2 = AP$, coincides with the one in the certificate, the proof is validated and the algorithm terminates in a single graph traversal for the initial query. Note that in the analysis example, there is an additional full iteration due to the existence of update events which make the analyzer re-process all arcs which depend on a calling pattern whose answer has been updated. It is well known that several passes over the program are often needed to reach a fixed point.

§8 Experimental Results

In this section we show some experimental results aimed at studying two crucial points for the practicality of our proposal: the checking time as compared to the analysis time, and the size of certificates. We have implemented the checker as a simplification of the generic abstract interpretation system of CiaoPP. It should be noted that this is an efficient, highly optimized, state-of-the-art analysis system which is part of a working compiler. Both the analysis and checker are parametric w.r.t. the abstract domain. In these experiments they both use the same implementation of the domain-dependent functions of the *sharing+freeness* domain ³²⁾. We have selected this domain because the information it infers is very useful for reasoning about instantiation errors, which is a crucial aspect for the safety of logic programs. The whole system is implemented in Ciao 1.11#200 ⁹⁾ with compilation to bytecode. All of our experiments have been performed on a Pentium 4 at 2.4GHz and 512MB RAM running GNU Linux RH9.0. The Linux kernel used is 2.4.25, customized with the *hrttime* patch to provide improved precision and resolution in time measurements.

8.1 Checking Time

Table 1 presents our experimental results regarding checking time. Execution times are given in milliseconds and measure *runtime*. They are computed as the arithmetic mean of five runs. A relatively wide range of programs has been used as benchmarks. They are the same ones used in ²²⁾, where they are described in some detail. For each benchmark, the columns for **Analysis** are

Bench	Analysis			Checking			Speedup	
	P_A	An	T_A	P_C	Ch	T_C	A/C	T_A/T_C
aiakl	2	87	89	2	71	72	1.2	1.2
ann	22	452	474	18	254	272	1.8	1.7
bid	4	56	60	4	35	38	1.6	1.6
boyer	9	143	151	7	85	92	1.7	1.6
browse	3	14	17	3	12	15	1.2	1.2
deriv	2	86	88	1	19	20	4.6	4.4
grammar	2	10	12	2	9	11	1.1	1.1
hanoiapp	2	25	26	2	16	18	1.5	1.5
mmatrix	1	13	14	1	10	11	1.3	1.3
occur	2	16	18	2	10	12	1.7	1.6
progeom	2	13	15	2	9	11	1.5	1.4
read	9	792	801	8	488	497	1.6	1.6
qplan	13	1411	1424	11	962	973	1.5	1.5
qsortapp	1	20	21	1	12	14	1.6	1.5
query	5	11	15	4	9	12	1.2	1.3
rdtok	8	141	149	6	43	49	3.3	3.1
serialize	2	40	42	2	17	19	2.3	2.2
warplan	8	173	181	7	108	115	1.6	1.6
witt	16	196	212	14	72	86	2.7	2.5
zebra	3	94	97	3	90	92	1.1	1.0
Overall							1.63	1.61

Table 1 Checking Time

the following: P_A is the time required by the *preprocessing phase*, in which program rules are processed and stored in the format required by the analyzer. The *analysis* time proper is shown in column **An**. The actual time needed for analysis –the sum of these two times– is shown in column T_A . Similarly, in the case of checking, three columns are shown. The preprocessing phase, P_C , includes asserting the certificate in addition to asserting the program to be analyzed. As the figures show, the overhead required for asserting the certificate is negligible. Column **Ch** is the time for executing the checking algorithm. Finally, T_C is the total time for checking. The columns under **Speedup** compare analysis and checking times. As can be seen in columns **A/C** and T_A/T_C , the checking algorithm is faster than the analysis algorithm in all cases. The actual speedup ranges from almost none, as in the case of zebra, to over four times faster in the case of deriv. The last row summarizes the results for the different benchmarks using a weighted mean, which places more importance on those benchmarks with relatively larger analysis times. We use as weight for each program its actual analysis time. We believe that this weighted mean is more informative than

	Source	Byte Code		Certificate	
Bench	Source	ByteC	B/S	Cert	C/S
aiakl	1555	3805	2.4	3090	2.0
ann	12745	43884	3.4	24475	1.9
bid	4945	10376	2.1	5939	1.2
boyer	11010	32522	3.0	12300	1.1
browse	2589	8467	3.3	1661	0.6
deriv	957	4221	4.4	288	0.3
grammar	1598	3182	2.0	1259	0.8
hanoiapp	1172	2264	1.9	2325	2.0
mmatrix	557	1053	1.9	880	1.6
occur	1367	6903	5.0	1098	0.8
progeom	1619	3570	2.2	2148	1.3
read	11843	24619	2.1	25359	2.1
qplan	9983	33472	3.4	20509	2.1
qsortapp	664	1176	1.8	2355	3.5
query	2090	8833	4.2	531	0.3
rdtok	13704	15354	1.1	6533	0.5
serialize	987	3801	3.9	1779	1.8
warplan	5203	23971	4.6	15305	2.9
witt	17681	41760	2.4	19131	1.1
zebra	2284	5396	2.4	4058	1.8
Overall	1		2.66		1.44

Table 2 Certificate Size

the arithmetic mean, as, for example, doubling the speed in which a large and complex program is analyzed (checked) is more relevant than achieving this for small, simple programs. Overall, the speedup is 1.63 in just analysis time, or 1.61 if we also take into account the preprocessing time. We believe that the achieved speedup is significant taking into account that `CiaoPP`'s analyzer for this domain is highly optimized and converges very efficiently ³⁹⁾. However, it is to be expected that, for other domains and implementations, the relative gains will be higher.

8.2 Certificate Size

Table 2 shows our experimental results regarding certificate size, coded in compact (*fastread*) format, for the different benchmarks and compares it to the size of the source code for the same program and to the size of the corresponding bytecode. To make this comparison fair, we subtract 4180 bytes from the size of the bytecode for each program: the size of the bytecode for an empty program in this version of `Ciao` (minimal top-level drivers and exception handlers for any

executable). The results show the size of the certificate to be quite reasonable. It ranges from 0.3 times the size of the source code (for `deriv`) to 3.5 (in the case of `qsortapp`). Overall, it is 1.44 times the size of the source code. We consider this acceptable since in general (C)LP programs are quite compact (up to 10 times more compact than equivalent imperative programs). In fact, the size of source plus certificate is smaller (1+1.44) than that of the bytecode (2.66).

§9 Conclusions and Related Work

We have presented *abstraction-carrying code* (ACC) as a novel enabling technology for PCC, which follows the standard strategy of associating safety certificates to programs but it is based throughout on the use of abstract interpretation techniques. We argue that ACC is highly flexible, one aspect being the parametricity on the abstract domain inherited from analysis engines as exemplified by those used in (C)LP. We argue that our proposal brings the expressiveness, flexibility, and automation which is inherent in the abstract interpretation techniques developed in logic programming to this area. Our approach has been illustrated by using the `CiaoPP` system. This system already uses a combination of abstract interpretation, abstract specialization, and a flexible assertion language, to perform program debugging, verification, and optimization with a wide variety of domains. Other approaches to abstract verification and debugging have also been proposed (see ^{15, 21} for further references). The system has been enhanced to produce certificates as dictated by the ACC scheme, as an integral part of the static debugging and verification performed during the program development process. A simplified version of the analysis framework of `CiaoPP` has also been developed that serves as an efficient checker of the certificates. The approach is currently being tested in a number of pervasive applications using an embedded version of the `Ciao` system which runs on PDAs and Gumstix processors. Ongoing work also includes the study of techniques for further reducing the size of certificates ¹⁾, and reducing the checking time.

It is important to note that our approach will work directly in other programming paradigms, such as imperative or functional programming (the latter already covered in our current system, since `Ciao` supports functional programming), as long as a static analyzer/checker is available. Note that the fundamental components of the approach (fixed-point semantics and abstract interpretation) have both been widely applied also in these paradigms. In fact, analyzers have been recently developed, for example, for analysis and verification

of Java, which are direct adaptations of essentially the same parametric fixpoint-based analysis algorithms that we have used in this work on the producer side ²⁹⁾. The ACC approach is thus directly applicable in this context.

Our approach differs from existing approaches to PCC in several aspects. In our case, the certificate is computed automatically on the producer side by an *abstract interpretation-based analyzer* and the certificate takes the form of a particular *subset* of the analysis results. The burden on the consumer side is reduced by using a simple *one-traversal* checker, which is a very simplified and efficient abstract interpreter which does not need to compute a fixed point.

A type-level dataflow analysis of Java virtual machine bytecode is also the basis of several existing verifiers ^{27, 26)}, and some are loosely based on abstract interpretation. These analyses allow proving that the program is correct w.r.t. type-related correctness conditions. In ⁴⁰⁾ a proposal is presented to split the type-based bytecode verification of the KVM (an embedded variant of the JVM) in two phases, where the producer first computes the certificate by means of a type-based dataflow analyzer and then the consumer simply checks that the types provided in the code certificate are valid. As in our case, the second phase can be done in a single, linear pass over the bytecode. However, these approaches are limited to types.

Let us note that our checker is part of the trusted computing base (TCB) and, hence, the code consumer has to trust also the domain operations. Other approaches to PCC use logic-based verification methods as enabling technology, an example is ⁴⁵⁾ which formalizes a simple assembly language with procedures and presents a safety policy for arithmetic overflow in Isabelle/HOL. Recently, a PCC architecture based on *Certified Abstract Interpretation* ¹¹⁾ has been proposed by Besson et. al ⁷⁾. This proposal follows the basics of ACC for certificate generation and checking, but relies on a *certified* checker specified in Coq ⁵⁾ in order to reduce the TCB. In contrast to our framework, this work is restricted to safety properties which hold for all states and, for now, it has only been implemented for a particular abstract domain.

The coexistence of several abstract domains in our framework is somewhat related to the notion of *models* to capture the security-relevant properties of code, as addressed in the work on Model-Carrying Code (MCC) ⁴²⁾. MCC enables code consumers to try out different security policies of interest and select one that can be statically proved to be consistent with the model associated to the untrusted code. However, models are intended to describe low-level prop-

erties and their combination has not been studied, which differs from our idea of combining (high-level) abstract domains. Another approach based on model checking (and also types) is that of ⁴⁶⁾. It is based on sending the “predicate abstraction” used in model checking to help reduce the state space search at the receiving end, where model checking is performed again on the received program. This approach is thus also quite different from ours, although by coincidence (because of the use of a predicate abstraction) it has been independently given the same name. Perhaps the most obvious difference is that this approach does not exploit the fundamental idea of our proposal of constructing iteratively a fixpoint on the producer’s end and checking it without any iteration at the receiving end. Also, it is not parametric on a set of domains as our generic model and it is presented only informally.

As a final consideration, it should be noted that while the particular instance of ACC that we have described in detail is actually defined at the source-level, in most existing PCC frameworks the code supplier typically packages the certificate with the *object* code rather than with the *source* code (we assume that both are untrusted). This is without loss of generality because the basic principles of our approach can also be applied to bytecode or machine code. Note that a good number of abstract interpretation-based analyses have been proposed in the literature for bytecode and machine code, most of which compute a fixpoint during analysis which can be checked in one pass at a receiving end using the general principle of our proposal. More concretely, the work mentioned above which uses similar fixpoint-based analysis algorithms to those that we have applied in this work on the producer side ²⁹⁾ performs the analysis and verification directly on Java bytecode, and thus supports the applicability of our approach to bytecode. In fact, also in recent work, even the concrete CLP verifier used in our ACC implementation (CiaoPP) has itself been shown to also be applicable without modification to Java bytecode via a transformational approach ²⁾.

In any case, both approaches (ACC for source code and ACC for object code) are of interest from our point of view: clearly, in many cases the source code is simply not available to the consumer and even when there is a choice between object and source code, using object code means reducing the trusted computing base in the consumer since there is no need for a compiler. On the other hand, open-source code is becoming much more relevant these days (in fact, `Ciao` and `CiaoPP` are themselves GNU-licensed and available in source code for reviewing

and modification). As a result, it is now realistic to expect that a relatively large amount of untrusted source code is available to the consumer. The advantages of open-source with respect to safety are important since it allows inspecting the code and applying powerful techniques for program analysis and validation which allow inferring information which may be difficult to observe in low-level, compiled code. This allows handling richer properties which in turn potentially allow more expressive safety policies.

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